Security Analytics Driving Better Metrics

Yolanta Beres HP Labs, UK

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
Agenda

- Risk Management Lifecycle
- Historical data based metrics
- Predictive Simulations: selecting better metrics
- Example: vulnerability and patch management
- Conclusions


Security Risk Analysis & Risk Measurement Lifecycle




Assessment of IT Associated Risk



Evaluate/Develop control architecture (i.e. set of controls to mitigate risks)



Operation & Evolution of Deployed Control Architecture





Changing Assurance Requirements




- Cyclical reviews
- Historical-based
- Intrusive
- Point-in-time retrospective
- Unexpected fluctuations in the control environment
- Adherence to rules

New Requirements


- Ongoing assurance
- Real-time & predictive
- Non-intrusive & remote
- Risk-based
- Analytical decision data
- Sustainable governance model

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Security Metrics: Today and Tomorrow




1. Models Driving continuous metrics gathering based on historical data



2. Simulation based security analysis and metrics identification Systems r

Systems Models to vary assumptions on threats & investments



Historical data based security metrics


- Often gathered because of audit/compliance requirements
- Allow administrators to measure performance against baseline
- Are meaningful measures to show
 - if security controls are working (not)effectively
 - where risk is emerging (sometimes)

System and security risk modelling

- Explore the effect of various unknown or difficult to obtain inputs, e.g. threat environment
- Enable the prediction of the outcome of investment decisions or changes in security policies
- Identify better RISK metrics
- Identify metrics that are relevant to an organisation

Audit selected key indicators

Measuring Inactive Users as a Leading Indicator of Security Effectiveness




Traditional security metrics for vulnerability reporting

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AMS Assurance Report Patch and Vulnerability Management					
□ <u>Security Policy</u> <u>Compliance</u> ■ <u>Account</u> <u>Information</u> □ <u>Vulnerabilities</u> ■ <u>Medium</u> <u>Severity</u> <u>Vulnerabilities</u> ■ <u>High</u> <u>Severity</u> <u>Vulnerabilities</u>	1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9	01-Jan-2008			
<u>Low</u> Severity	Time				
Vulnerabilities	Source Node	Metric Name	Value	Status	
	Medium Severity Vulnerabilities	Count-data	45		
Management	High Severity Vulnerabilities	Count-data	164	•	
	Low Severity Vulnerabilities	Count-data	122		
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Traditional security metrics for patch management



Better metrics needed

Example: threat mitigation by patch management

- Historical metrics
 - Indicate performance of patch management process
 - Show what happened


But:

- Do not explain why or implications
 - Is it high risk if a couple of patches are not installed?
 - How much an organization will be exposed when malware hits?



Stochastic Simulations: what are they?

- A large number of discrete event simulations which reflect the random variation in the input events as observed in historical data
- Capture/model the system, its usage and processes
- Sample the known distributions for input events: exploit after disclosure and for patch after disclosure
- Monte-Carlo approach to gather statistically significant information, via repeated experimental runs.
- Measure potential outcomes as probability distributions




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Vulnerability Management Example

- Select the metric: exposure window
 - Time from vulnerability disclosure to risk reduced
- Model the patch management processes, and processes to deploy early, often signature-based mitigations and workarounds
- Analysis
 - Current state: assessing robustness against threat environment assumptions
 - Potential improvements



Selecting metrics based on vulnerability timeline



Showing time to risk reduced as probability distribution function across thousands of vulnerability instance


Select metrics

- •Mean time to risk reduced
- •Early mitigation: within the first days of disclosure
- •The tail: after the set policy deadline

14 25 July, 2008




Modelling the security processes



15 25 July, 2008* Source: Stefan Frei, Martin May, Ulrich Fiedler, Bernhard Plattner. Large-Scale Vulnerability Analysis. Proc. of SIGCOMM'06 Workshops, September 2006


Risk reduced window overall



	Proportion mitigated in early days	Proportion not mitigated after the policy deadline
Current state	33%	31%



What is the state when malware arrives?





Better metrics for historical monitoring

- Previously:
 - #patches not installed
 - #open vulnerabilities
- After the modelling and simulations:
 - How long vulnerabilities have been opened
 - How many patches are behind policy dictated deadline
 - How many patches not installed that AV does not cover
 - Monitoring threat level for each case



Conclusions

- Historical data based metrics are good to show
 - Where controls are working effectively
 - Or where risk is emerging
- Predictive modelling allows
 - Helps select better metrics that are risk indicators of current and future security risks
 - Ensure robustness of selected metrics in changing conditions
 - Use metrics in simulations to understand trade-offs between different solutions





